The Impact of Geostrategists
Vicious combat has turned the Berlin supported national secessionist project, into a catastrophe in South Sudan.
According to recent estimates, approximately 10,000 people have been killed in the military conflict since mid-December.
Aimed at weakening Sudan, the German government had vigorously supported the secession of South Sudan – not only politically but also with concrete programs for “establishing a state.”
Sudan was considered to be among the more anti-western segments of the Arab world. While three-fourths of Sudan’s oil reserves are located in South Sudan, which has already established close ties with the pro-western East African countries of Kenya and Uganda.
The German government had promoted the geostrategically motivated secessionist project, even though observers had been warning against the renewal of violence in South Sudan.
Already in the 1990s, rival forces had been engaged in brutal combat. Observers warned that this combat could resurge, once Juba decides over the distribution of national resources. And this is exactly what has happened.
According to recent estimates, approximately 10,000 people – possibly even more – have already been killed in the armed conflict in South Sudan.
The present military conflict began December 15, following an alleged attempted coup, led by former vice president Riek Machar, who had been ousted in the summer 2013.
The Juba regime arrested eleven senior politicians of Machar’s faction and engaged his militia militarily, which retaliated fiercely.
According to official reports, there are more than 200,000 refugees, possibly many more. Refugees report that civilians are arbitrarily killed and members of particular ethnic groups targeted.
In fact, both President Salva Kiir (Dinka) and his rival Riek Machar (Nuer) are inciting animosity between their respective ethnic groups. The conflict is escalating.
The South Sudanese conflict is also a result of German foreign policy, given Berlin’s years of support in helping to prepare secession of the region and the consolidation thereafter.
For example, Berlin had undertaken measures to advise the South Sudanese in their legislative and judicial matters along with the establishment of a South Sudanese Constitution, carried out by the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg, initially with consultations back in 1998 and with intensity since 2002. In 2002, the CDU-affiliated Konrad Adenauer Foundation invited South Sudanese separatists to Germany, to report to “interested circles” – such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – “on their efforts” to “establish a well regulated polity in South Sudan.”
In 2007, the state-owned GIZ development agency (at the time it was known as the GTZ) initiated a “program to support state establishment” in South Sudan which included the counseling of ministries and administrative organizations. Following additional measures.
Berlin gave political backing to the secession referendum in 2011, which formally sealed South Sudan’s secession. Since 2005, German troops have been stationed both in Sudan and South Sudan; they were also expected to secure the consolidation of South Sudan in the aftermath of the secession.
Berlin, alongside Washington and London, had pressed ahead with the secession despite warnings of grave consequences that critical observers were issuing – warnings that are now proving to have been well founded.
For example, the process of establishing the borders between Sudan and South Sudan have led to strong dissention and bloody conflicts – because no agreement could be reached on whether the borders should prohibit nomadic sectors of the population from entering their grazing grounds; or because both sides were laying claim to the same oil fields.
Perhaps even more serious, were the warnings that, once secession has been accomplished, it could lead to acrimonious power struggles inside South Sudan.
This prognosis was based on the fact that during the civil war against the north of the country, various rebel groups in southern Sudan were already feuding among themselves, and, in some cases, these feuds were fought out with even more brutality than the battles against the Khartoum government forces.
In 1991, the militias, led by Riek Machar, split from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and began to engage them in military combat. At the time, the rivals also resorted to ethnic ties to overcome their adversaries. In 1991, Machar’s militia massacred several thousand Dinka in Bor.
While Berlin was pressing ahead with the secession of southern Sudan, observers were warning that these power struggles could flair up again, as soon as the various factions of the SPLA had divided up control over the national resources among themselves. This is exactly what has now transpired.
In spite of all warnings, the obstinate support for secession was aimed at the establishment of an independent South Sudan – a region holding approx. three-fourths of Sudan’s oil deposits.
With the south’s secession from the north, Khartoum was deprived not only of the control over this gigantic region, but also over its resources.
This is very important, from the Western point of view, because Sudan was seen as one of the Arab countries with a hostile tendency toward the West.
Juba, on the other hand, is seeking to link up with the East African Community (EAC), a pro-Western international alliance.
South Sudan’s secession served to weaken – what the West sees as – an insubordinate government and to incorporate the South Sudanese resources into the compliant EAC.
EAC member nations Kenya and Uganda have in fact developed predominating economic influence in Juba and have begun linking South Sudan to their international alliance.
Thwarting China was the objective of initial German plans for supporting the secession of South Sudan.
Whereas in and around 2005, German and other Western companies were preparing to engage in Juba, the People’s Republic of China had been closely cooperating with Khartoum. In the meantime, Chinese economic influence in South Sudan has clearly grown, particularly in the oil industry.
The geostrategic operations to split South Sudan away from the rest of the country, in which Berlin has played a major role, has now, with the current conflicts, developed into a catastrophe.
Uganda has already dispatched troops to South Sudan, to try to prevent the country from skidding into total civil war. Ugandan fighter planes are said to have bombed positions of Riek Machar’s militias, who have announced retaliatory measures, should Uganda – which has always loyally defended pro-Western positions in Eastern Africa  – get involved.
This would widen the South Sudan conflict to another country and further destabilize the already seriously instable East Africa  – another example for the disastrous impact of Western geostrategists.
 New Estimate Sharply Raises Death Toll in South Sudan. www.nytimes.com 09.01.2013.
 See also Establishing a State.
 See also Heißer Frieden.
 See also Nächstes Jahr ein neuer Staat.
 See also At the Brink of War.
 Members of the East African Community (EAC) are Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Regarding the EAC see also Die Macht der Finanziers.
 See also The Prompters.
 See also Interventionspolitik und Terror.
The Western takeover of South Sudan mirrors the Western separation of Darfur from Sudan to gain control of the extensive Darfur resources.